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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax
THE FEDMERAL ESTATE TAX is an excise on the transfer of property at
death.' The tax is levied not on the persons who receive property from a
decedent according to the amounts which they receive, but on the entire
estate of the decedent before it is distributed. In this respect an estate tax
differs from an inheritance tax, which is a tax on the right to recetve prop-
erty from a decedent.2
Decedents estates for federal tax purposes are comprised of assets sub-
ject to probate admimstration and certain assets not subject to probate
administration. Non-probate assets that are included in a decedent's taxable
estate are: transfers of property in contemplation of, or taking effect at,
death; 3 transfers of property with power in the transferor to alter, amend
or revoke;4 joint or community property and tenancies by the entirety;5
property controlled by power of appointment; and proceeds of life insur-
ance policies. 7
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the executor shall pay the
federal estate tax 8 and, because he has only probate assets in his possession,
he has to pay the tax with the probate assets. The word "executor" as used
in the statute includes "administrator."'
The problem then arises whether the executor or administrator may
obtain a proportionate contribution for the payment of the tax from all the
assets of the estate, probate and non-probate. This problem is twofold;
there is a question of apportionment among the probate assets, and a
question of apportionment between probate and non-probate assets. The
entire problem of apportionment has been settled in fifteen states by the
enactment of apportionment statutes.10 This discussion will be confined,
unless otherwise specified, to cases decided without the benefit of such
statutes. It should also be borne in mind that when the intention of the
'PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION § 1.05 (1942)
2 Ibid.
'INT. REv. CODE § 811 (c)
'INT. REV. CODE § 811 (d)
'INT. REV. CODE § 811 (e)
'INT. REV. CODE § 811 (f)
7 INT. REv. CODE § 811 (g)
8INT. REv. CODE § 822 (b)
9 INT. REV. CODE § 930 (a)
10ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 150 (1948); CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 970-77
(1944); CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 2075-81 (1949); DEL. REV. CODE C. 119
(1947); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 734.041 (Supp. 1951); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
art. 81, § 126 (Cum. Supp. 1947); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 65A, § 5-5B (Supp. 1950);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2108 (1950); N.H. REv. LAWS c. 175 (1943) as amended
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deceased regarding tax incidence is clearly expressed by a testamentary pro-
vision, this intention governs. '
APPORTIONMENT AMONG PROBATE AssErs
In the case where a person dies intestate leaving an estate composed of
real and personal probate assets, can the administrator, who will pay the
tax out of the personalty,"2 recover from the realty its proportionate amount
of the federal estate tax? The cases are few on this point, for a person
with a large estate usually dies testate. Kentucky has decided that the
realty should bear its proportionate burden of the tax,' 3 but New Jersey, be-
fore the enactment of its apportionment statute,'4 held that the personalty
should bear the entire burden.'5
If a person dies testate, the majority of courts, including Ohio,'0 have
held that the residuary estate is liable for the entire tax.'7 Most of these
courts reason that, in the absence of any direction in the will providing for
the payment of the tax, it is the testator's intention that the residuary estate
pay the tax. This reasoning is persuasive for in the abatement of wills the
residuary estate is usually first liable for the payment of debts.' 8 A New
Hampshire decision which overruled prior decisions allowing apportion-
ment among probate assets,'9 required the residuary estate to pay the entire
by LAWS c. 102 (1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3.26-45 (Supp. 1950); N.Y. DEcE-
DENT EST. LAW § 124 (Supp. 1951); PA. STAT. ANN. Ut. 20, § 844 (1950); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8350.7 (Williams Supp. 1951); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
3683a (Vernon's Supp. 1950); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-150 (1949). For a general
discussion of the statutes see Reidy, Apportionment of Estate Taxes Application of
State Statutes, 88 TRusTs AND ESTATES 623 (1949)
'See Note, 15 A.L.R. 2d 1216 (1951).
"Generally the realty passes at once to the heirs. A lsoN, WiLLs § 262 (1937).
"Marn v. Martin's Adm'r, 283 Ky. 513, 142 S.W 2d 164 (1940); Hampton's
Adm'rs v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W 496 (1920).
'N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3:26-45 (Supp. 1950). For a discussion of this statute see
Saiber and Widmark, Estates Taxes and the New Jersey Apportionment Act, 73
N.J.LJ. 319 (1950).
"Turner v. Cole, 118 N.J.Eq. 497, 179 Ad. 113 (1935)
" Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922), aff'd, 264 U.S. 47,
44 Sup. Ct. 291 (1924). The Ohio court said that the state law as to the preference
of devises and bequests is controlling and that the testator showed his intention that
the residue should bear the burden of the tax by remaining silent as to the payment
of taxes.
"Hepburn v. Winthrop, 83 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Plunkett v. Old Colony
Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919); Bryant v. Green, 328 Mo. 1226,
44 S.W.2d 7 (1931); Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922),
afi'd, 264 U.S. 47, 44 Sup. Ct. 291 (1924); Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of
Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 200 Ad. 200 Ad. 786 (1938); Re Hamlin, 226
N. Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4, cert. dented, 250 U.S. 672, 40 Sup. Ct. 14 (1919)
"ATuNsoN, WiLLs § 250 (1937).
" Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 200 Ad. 786
(1938), overruling, Fuller v. Gale, 78 N.H. 544, 103 Ad. 308 (1918) and Wil-
liams v. State, 81 N.H. 341, 125 Ad. 661 (1924)
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tax, and based its decision not on the ground that the testator intended it
to pay all the tax, 20 but on the ground that the federal estate tax, being a
transfer tax and not a succession or receipts tax, is not to be prorated among
those who succeed to the decedents estate.
If the residuary estate consists of realty and personalty, it has been held
that the personalty is first liable.2 '
In a case of partial intestacy or in a case where there is no residuary
estate, the question of where the burden of the tax should fall will naturally
arise. Since the courts have treated the tax as a debt of the estate,2 2 as a
charge against the estate23 and as an expense of admimstration;24 it would
seem to follow that the tax will be paid from that fund which would, as in
the case of other debts, charges and expenses of admimstration, abate first
in each particular jurisdiction.
Kentucky, relying on their prior decisions in cases of intestacy, has al-
lowed apportionment among probate assets.2 5 Although a minority de-
cision, the equities are in favor of this conclusion. The presumption of the
testator's intention is a mere fiction in most cases and the fact that the
federal estate tax is an estate tax and not an inheritance tax should not of
itself preclude apportionment.
APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN PROBATE AND NON-PROBATE AssErs
A decision disallowing apportionment among probate assets is not
authority for a case involving probate and non-probate assets, and a court
not allowing apportionment among purely probate assets would not over-
rule itself by allowing apportionment between probate and non-probate
assets.
The Internal Revenue Code specifically provides that the executor may
recover proportionate contributions from such non-probate assets as life
insurance proceeds and property controlled by powers of appointment.28
As to other non-probate assets the code is silent regarding apportionment.
. The court said that the testator's silence was ambiguous and gave no dear idica-
tion of his intention in respect to the incidence of the burden of the tax.
'Hepburn v. Winthrop, 83 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
'Hepburn v. Winthrop, 83 F.2d 566 (D.C.Cir. 1936); Plunkett v. Old Colony
Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919)
'Hepburn v. Winthrop, 83 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Brown's Estate v. Hoge,
198 Iowa 373, 199 N.W 320 (1924); Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140
N.E. 114 (1922), aff'd, 264 U.S. 47, 44 Sup. Ct. 291 (1924); Plunkett v. Old
Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919).
'Hepburn v. Winthrop, 83 F.2d 566 (D.C.Cir. 1936); Brown's Estate v. Hoge,
198 Iowa 373, 199 N.W 320 (1924); Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass.
471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919)
'
5Lousville Trust Co. v. Walter, 306 Ky. 756, 207 S.W.2d 328 (1948)
INT. REv. CODE § 826 (c) & (d).
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The case of Riggs v. Del Drago,'27 decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1942, held that while the executor must pay the federal estate
tax in the first instance, it is a matter of state law as to where the ultimate
burden of the tax will fall.28 Prior to the Del Drago case the decided weight
of authority was against apportionment between probate and non-probate
assets.2  Some courts took the position that when Congress specified that
the estate tax should be paid by the executor, it intended to impose the
entire tax on the executor, whether the taxable estate was composed of
probate or probate and non-probate assets. 30 These same courts also rea-
soned that, because Congress expressly allowed apportionment with respect
to some non-probate assets and was silent as to others, Congress did not in-
tend to allow apportionment except where it was specifically provided for
in the code.
Randolph Paul makes the following comment on the Del Drago deci-
sion:
Riggs v. Del Drago is not merely significant for the constitutional free-
dom it affords to local apportionment legislation. State courts in jurisdic-
tions lacking such statutes might well reexamine their earlier decisions
which sanctioned tax distortion on the basis of supposed Congressional in-
tention, whether express or implicit The Supreme Court has now an-
nounced that estate tax incidence is a state matter and the local courts
are accordingly free to fashion equitable solutions in the absence of state
legislation.
Where a person dies intestate possessed of an estate composed of pro-
bate and non-probate assets, the decedent has manifested no intention, ex-
press or implied, concerning who should bear the burden of the tax. The
Del Drago decision frees the state courts from any Congressional prohibi-
tion against apportionment in such a situation and permits each state to
decide the issue for itself. Since the Del Drago case, the two courts con-
sidering this situation have permitted apportionment on the ground that
"317 U.S. 95, 63 Sup. Ct. 109 (1942).
"See Note, 142 A.L.R 1131 (1943).
'Erickson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 198 Ad. 176 (1938); Central Trust Co. v.
Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469 (1936); Pratt v. Dean, 246 Mass. 300, 140 N.E.
924 (1923); Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923); Dexter v.
Jackson, 245 Mass. 333, 140 N.E. 267 (1923); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769 (1924), cert. dented, 266 U.S. 633, 45 Sup.
Ct. 225 (1925); Ely's Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C. 663 (1936). Contra: Regents of Urn-
versity System of Georga v. Trust Co. of Georga, 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.2d 691
(1942); Gaede v. Carroll, 114 N.J.Eq. 524, 169 Ad. 172 (1933).
'Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923); Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769 (1924), cert. dented, 266 U.S. 633,
45 Sup. Ct 225 (1925).
"PAUL, FEDmzAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, 1946 SUPPLEMENT § 13.54 at
page 465 (1946).
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it would be inequitable to permit non-probate assets to profit at the expense
of probate assets.3 2
If a person dies testate leaving an estate consisting of probate and non-
probate assets, even assuming for the moment that the residuary estate
should be held liable for the burden of taxes on his probate estate, it does
not follow that he intended his probate assets to pay the tax on his non-
probate estate. Among decisions since the Del Drago case, the weight of
authority is in favor of apportionment.3 In a case where the decedent
had made inter-vivos gifts in contemplation of death, the Kentucky court
holding for apportionment, said, "The obligation of the personal repre-
sentative to pay the tax is a mere rule of admimstration to insure its pay-
ment, and does not in any way affect the rights of the heirs and distributees
as among themselves."34
SOLUTIONS AND CONCLUSION
The enactment of a federal statute allowing apportionment is unlikely
for two reasons. First, if Congress made apportionment of the tax manda-
tory, it would in effect be changing the estate tax to an inheritance tax.
This does not result when a state directs apportionment because the state
is not the taxing authority.3 5 Secondly and more realistically, the federal
government is not concerned with the question of who pays the tax, but
" Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Bloomington, 96 N.E. 2d 918, rehearing
dented, 98 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. App. 1951) (administrator could not enhance value
of the non-probate assets by paying entire tax from probate assets); In re Gato's
Estate, 276 App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dept. 1950) A Florida resident
died intestate leaving two inter-vivos trusts in New York. The trustee in New York
applied to the New York Court for instructions as to whether he should pay a pro-
rata share of the Federal Estate Tax. The court directed the trustee to pay.
At the time this arride was sent to the printers the case of McDougall, Adm'r v.
Central Nat. Bank was pending before the Ohio Supreme Court. The Appellate
Court (not reported) held against apportionment.
' Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Bloomington, 96 N.E.2d 918, rehearing
denied, 98 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. App. 195 1); Trimble v. Hatcher s Ex'rs., 295 Ky. 178,
173 S.W.2d 985 (1943), cert. denied, Trimble v. Justice, 321 U.S. 747, 64 Sup. Ct.
611 (1944); Succession of Ratcliffe, 212 La. 563, 33 So.2d 114 (1947); In re
Coiner's Trust, 101 N.Y.S.2d 916 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950); In re Gato's Estate, 276
App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dept. 1950); Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlong,
76 A.2d 600 (R.I. 1951) Contra: Seattle First Nat. Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash.
2d 696, 203 P.2d 1078 (1949) The court held that the probate estate is liable for
the entire tax, and followed the reasoning of Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140
N.E. 686 (1923)
'Trimble v. Hatchers Ex'rs., 295 Ky.178,184, 173 S.W 2d 985,988 (1943),
cert. denied, Trimble v. Justice, 321 U.S. 747, 64 Sup. Ct. 611 (1944)
Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799,813 (1943) Randolph
Paul, in criticizing this reasoning as being unrealistic, states: "The criteria of in-
cidence for tax purposes should not necessarily determine ultimate burden among
recipients."
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only whether the tax be paid, and initial payment by the executor is assured
with or without an apportionment statute.
A more probable solution to the apportionment problem is by way
of state legislation. It is obvious that state legislation can be a desirable
and effective method of solving the problem as evidenced by the fact that
fifteen states have enacted apportionment statutes.38 In the absence of
statute the attorney can solve the problem of apportionment by drafting
an instrument which dearly shows his client's intention as to the burden of
the tax.
The remaining solution to the problem lies with the state courts who,
after the Del Drago decision, can allow apportonment without benefit of
statute. It is to be hoped that these decision allowing apportonment will
continue to be forthcoming so that, even in the absence of any legislation,
apportionment of the federal estate tax may become a firmly established
rule.
ROBERT B. PRESTON, JR.
'See note 10 supra.
